

ELI ZARETSKY

A Social and Cultural History of Psychoanalysis

Secrets of the Soul: The Social and Cultural History of Psychoanalysis

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Although psychoanalysis is not much more than a century old, it has a rich and vast history in terms of the development of theory and therapy, education and training, as well as institutions and movement. The repercussions of psychoanalytic ideas clinically and in other fields have been immense and psychoanalytic terms are an intrinsic part of our contemporary everyday discourse. The formation and transmission of ideas within the context of the culture, organisations and institutions are here examined in terms of the intersection of people, history, society and ideas. Issues of the origins and development of psychoanalytic concepts, the soil in which they have grown and the people and institutions that played significant roles interweave throughout this rich and comprehensive book. It is a history of psychoanalytic ideas, of a profession and movement across the world. Zaretsky has reached beyond understanding Freud to researching the development of the movement Freud began.

Secrets of the Soul is written by Eli Zaretsky, a professor of history at the New School in New York. Zaretsky, founding editor of the *Socialist Review* in the 1970s, has an abiding interest in the relationship between culture and psychoanalysis, using a neo-Marxist approach. This focus is evidenced by his previous book, *Capitalism, the Family and Personal Life* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976). *Secrets of the Soul* is the culmination of this concern and displays his particular approach which is subject to both the strengths and weaknesses of a Marxist perspective. The strengths include a focus on the big picture with the relationship between ideas and social, historical and economic structures investigated as a system. The weaknesses of such an approach include over-generalisation and connecting dots more on the basis of ideology than of evidence. Zaretsky makes an argument marshalling a good deal of evidence that raises interesting questions about the development of psychoanalysis within socio-cultural contexts.

I adopted this book (hot off the press) as the main text for a Masters in Psychoanalytic Studies online unit on 'Psychoanalysis: History and Institutions' at Deakin University in the second semester of 2004. The students were enthusiastic about the book and clearly gained much from a close study of it.

Zaretsky claims that psychoanalysis has not been adequately placed in its historical frame which would allow it to be understood in both its emancipatory and its oppressive aspects, as he sees them. In a similar fashion to the way feminist psychoanalyst, Juliet Mitchell, in her classic *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* (1975) argued that Freud was a child of his time but described and unmasked patriarchy rather than recommending it, Zaretsky confronts the notion that psychoanalysis is both part of the problem and (more importantly) part of the solution as it helps

unmask the problem even where it seems to be perpetuating it. Still, this central paradox is the one that Zaretsky confronts since psychoanalysis has so often been viewed as cementing stereotypes (such as feminine roles).

Although psychoanalysis has a dual character as both emancipatory and accommodating, Zaretsky argues that it is 'the first great theory of personal life', an argument that flows from his earlier work, *Capitalism, the Family and Personal Life* (1986). Zaretsky traces the role of our experience of the family through the 'second industrial revolution' and the implications for individuals in 'defamilialization, the freeing of individuals from unconscious images of authority originally rooted in the family'. The idea of the personal unconscious reflected the new realities of personal life in a transformed social world. This meant that one's social condition was not necessarily connected to how one experienced the world and oneself (p. 5).

Zaretsky makes an important claim that philosophy, the hallmark of the enlightenment, was replaced by psychoanalysis as well as modernist art and literature in the second industrial revolution. Psychoanalysis hovered, according to Zaretsky, between 'mystification' and modernity. 'Mystification' was a term that Marx invented meaning making real relationships mysterious and unclear. Marx's most important example was how commodities which humans used to reach their goals came to be ends in themselves under capitalism. Marx claims that we cease to see our true relationships clearly and instead see ourselves through the prism of exchange value. Likewise, in Zaretsky's view, psychoanalysis could be used to legitimise the current alienated condition—as well as to unmask that alienation.

Zaretsky asserts that just as Calvinism helped enable the first industrial revolution — Max Weber described the 'protestant ethic' as sparking and enshrining the spirit of capitalism— psychoanalysis sparks and enshrines the spirit of the second industrial revolution. People separated from their families to become consumers, to be outside the family and participate in the social system of mass consumption and mass markets. Self control and thrift gave way to the dreamworlds of the mass market. Major changes in personality and subjectivity, Zaretsky argues, accompanied the second industrial revolution and psychoanalysis became associated with the new personal autonomy of the self. But psychoanalysts were then faced with the issue of why autonomy was so difficult to achieve and devised terms such as ambivalence, resistance, defence and a theory of the ego (p. 9). The third industrial revolution now upon us is where mass production gave way to globalisation and an information-based economy (p. 11).

Although this is the overarching theoretical perspective in which psychoanalysis is situated, the rest of the book shows the particular roles that Freud and psychoanalysts played within these developments both as contributors and legitimators of established social systems. Zaretsky's position derives from a neo-Marxist perspective which investigates how the ideological superstructure is conditioned by the economic base and how the critical theory of society situates the individual as producer and consumer within the socioeconomic productive context, the mode in which things are produced.

Zaretsky first describes the formulation of the concept of the 'personal unconscious' in relation to the nineteenth century liberal perspective, in particular the elevation of the family as a 'haven in a heartless world' as distinct from the brutal and cruel workplace. He describes Freud's early developments to his formulation of his theory of the personal unconscious, in particular in his path-breaking *Interpretation of Dreams* (p. 26ff.) Freud transformed psychology by not retreating

from enlightenment values but, on the contrary, by developing a new concept of personal, as opposed to moral, autonomy which 'could validate individual strivings for freedom and happiness' (p. 39). The personal unconscious could not be reduced to the socio-political environment but, as Zaretsky suggests, this insight in itself would not make psychoanalysis a charismatic force. That force was sexuality which put substance into the idea of an inner life. Freud's idea that individuals have their own approach to sexuality and love resonated with the new developments of personal life.

The role of men and women in families and work changed with the second industrial revolution as new ideas of autonomy developed. The idea of 'individuality' came as a new strand in consciousness of gender, in particular women and homosexuals. Moreover, the nature of sexuality was being explored by sexologists at the time, including ideas about the nature of infantile sexuality, female sexuality, homosexuality and bisexuality. Freud's early investigations of hysteria were based on the idea that libido was masculine and what was repressed in both sexes was feminine, and women were more inclined to repression. Zaretsky emphasises the importance of the defamilialisation that developed with the second industrial revolution where people came to be and see themselves as productive individuals instead of as being determined by their familial roles. In particular, this meant a new consciousness for men about their fathers and other men.

After the publication of *The Interpretation of Dreams* in 1900, Freud founded the Wednesday Society which would later become the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. Zaretsky contends that men's new consciousness was enacted in the relationships of the circle of dependent men with Freud the father. He goes on to discuss the role of bisexuality rather than heterosexuality in Freud's clinical understanding and how he 'cracked the gender code of nineteenth-century liberal culture'. Freud developed a language which centred on 'recognising the universality not only of dependency needs but of fear and vulnerability'. The range of experiences made available were, in Zaretsky's view, the deepest contribution of psychoanalysis. Freud was part of the modernist sensibility in expressing individual unconscious wishes.

The new role of *personal life* went beyond both economic necessity and the traditional family. Personal life pointed to something 'utopian' beyond economic necessity for society's aims. Utopianism can be linked with the rise of romanticism in the nineteenth century, which was also based on the changes Zaretsky remarks upon. There was increasing room to move as necessity decreased and in liberal societies also less authoritarianism from the state about how exactly the individual had to live, quite an advance for both individual and social freedom (p. 64).

According to Zaretsky, psychoanalysis faced a dilemma in on the one hand accepting social norms and being absorbed or resisting them, and on the other becoming removed from everyday life. The new therapeutic professions together with the research university (including medicine) and their close relation to the corporate organisations of the second industrial revolution made for legitimacy (p. 65). Zaretsky asserts that the birth of the psychoanalytic circle reflected a change from state-employed bureaucrats to self-employed professionals mainly unaffiliated with institutions, and the correlative move from traditional to 'organic' intellectuals. The transformation of nineteenth century liberalism by the second industrial revolution was a precondition for the rise of psychoanalysis (p. 68).

Zaretsky describes the founding moments of the charismatic sect of psychoanalysis—those who saw in Freud's approach 'a breakthrough into a whole new level of civilisation'. Yet there was an equally strong sense of traumatic hurt that consolidated analytic identity. Zaretsky describes the

identification with Freud as something beyond fathers and sons as the identification with his ideas (pp. 74–75). However, while there can be a fascination with a genius which would draw a valuable surrounding circle, is it then necessary to follow the particular views of that genius or is it possible to critique the points raised? The vehemence of Freud's opposition to dissidents showed how little he welcomed disagreement. That could be a result of narcissism or whatever, but a movement can be founded on the word of the master without this necessitating disciples. I was privileged to have a close intellectual relationship with a genius, Elliott Jaques, who positively eschewed any discipleship in the interests of the progression of knowledge rather than stymieing it. Schools bring disciples which in turn brings stagnation. Had Freud's seminar stayed open instead of being so controlled, psychoanalysis could have developed quite differently. Psychoanalysis began to adopt the esoteric pipeline approach typical of cults.

The marginal European reception of psychoanalysis contrasted with its US reception. There was, as Zaretsky asserts, a mind-cure movement in the US. (pp. 76–80) But also US medicine was not formed and there was a greater sense of openness to new ideas that the New World fostered. Zaretsky argues that the particular way that psychoanalysis was accepted was instrumental and pragmatic, much in line with Freud's own views on America. However, the US also has a proud history of intellectual innovation. I am not sure that Zaretsky's assertion about the extent of the instrumental perspective in psychoanalysis is well-founded. Freud's own ideas about the US were unfounded European stereotyped prejudices. Freud saw America as 'gigantic yes', but a 'gigantic mistake'. He was concerned about crass dollar materialism and how psychoanalysis would become the 'handmaiden of psychiatry'. This was all too easy and simplistic as is anti-Americanism in general—consider the fact that the US saved psychoanalysis from Nazism and the fact that the Germans and the IPA had such a sorry history about psychoanalysis during the Nazi era.

Although Freud wanted professional legitimacy, this did not occur. Sectarian isolation with self pity was one pole while mass popularity was another in the development of analytic identity. The formation of the IPA was an important but in Freud's eyes at the time an impotent gesture that backfired with Jung's departure. It was an opportunity to bring in many others that failed (pp. 88–90).

Zaretsky asserts that Enlightenment thinkers never formulated a psychology of the individual because they were focused on universal laws and moral principles. They wanted to be 'analysts of the soul' along the same lines that physicists and chemists were analysts of the material world. In fact science in the nineteenth century took on the mantle of such an optimistic and mechanistic view of the universe. Zaretsky makes the important point that this perspective sharply contrasted with modernist views which started with interiority to be accessed from within. There was a marked shift away from rationalism towards the particularity of the individual and their experience (p. 91).

According to Zaretsky, the schisms also transformed the psychoanalytic movement. Freud himself embodied the authority he claimed to analyse, the primal father of Freud's *Totem and Taboo* (pp. 93–94). In psychoanalytic history it is noteworthy how many figures come to new concepts through their personal experiences of psychoanalytic conflicts. He claims these schisms opened psychoanalysis to women and moved away from charisma to a relatively democratic, mixed-sex movement after World War 1 (p. 94). Zaretsky associates the virtually all-male composition of psychoanalysis with the father complex and the changes that were developing in relation to recognising the mother as more women entered the ranks (p. 108).

Freud's formation of 'The Committee' to preserve psychoanalysis was an important moment, setting the tone as Zaretsky points out of 'a sect within a sect' (pp. 104–105). Everything changed in the world around the time of the Great War, 'the war to end all wars'. The closeness of death from human aggression on a mass scale changed everything, including the reevaluation of the nature of civilisation and our drives by Freud and other social theorists. That war, as Zaretsky observed, 'shattered the nineteenth century liberal worldview', a view which implied relentless progress towards enlightenment (pp. 117–119). One major outcome of 'modernity' for psychoanalysis was the phenomenon of the impact of the 'war neuroses', in particular the effects of 'shell shock' (pp. 121–124).

Although clearly death was in the foreground in World War 1, Zaretsky claims this had less effect on Freud's theorising than has been asserted. The repetition compulsion was an important development in Freud's ideas. Repetition was, as Zaretsky observes, a misguided way of trying to master the original trauma. Freud's theory, then, went beyond repetition and ended up challenging his own earlier theories, substituting new structures of id, ego and superego for his earlier topology as well as developing the concept of the death instinct (pp. 124–125).

Zaretsky points to the war ending the idea of the family as haven by 'situating trauma and repetition at the core of sexual and emotional life'. This meant that the place of concepts moved—self-preservation became defensive rather than primary and direct interpretation was replaced by uncovering resistances. Further, Zaretsky claims that the passive side of femininity was difficult to grasp—understanding passivity became an important part of grasping what Wilhelm Reich termed the 'mass psychology of fascism'(p. 126).

Yet romanticism dominated the far left as well as the far right. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 seemed to fit with the social democratic ideals of many psychoanalysts. There was the importance of psychoanalysis for the broad masses that Freud mentioned in his 1919 essay, 'Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy' and the idea of social liberation in general. Such Utopian hopes starkly contrasted with the ravages of the War (pp. 126-27). But in terms of political social democracy, the issue of therapy for the masses arose in an era where there was no public health system, no Medicare, and the sick had to fend for themselves. The War sensitised psychoanalysts to the widespread need for therapy and outpatient clinics developed in a number of countries in the years following. The idea of mass analysis had implications for related social areas such as crime, human relations, the upbringing of children and social work, all revolutionary at the time (pp. 127–129). In contrast with psychoanalysis Marxism did not see personal life as intrinsically important since it was a reflex of the economic structure. Personal salvation could come only with overthrowing the type of society that gave rise to alienation.

After the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, the Moscow Institute was the second world psychoanalytic institute and one eighth of the members of the IPA were in the USSR. Freud was widely translated and Lenin complained that psychoanalysis had become a fad. After Stalin outlawed psychoanalysis, the repression of psychoanalysis in the USSR was only lifted in the 1980s (pp. 130–132).

Zaretsky turns to a consideration of the development of 'Fordism', the changes in society and the economy and the two-way relationship with the development of psychoanalysis. According to Zaretsky, Henry Ford was the greatest post World War I symbol and was the biggest influence on the development of production and consumption with his developments in planning and rationalisation. This had effects on new fields of communication and the marketplace with

psychoanalysis the central, dominant conception that drove it.

In the 1920s with the qualitative changes in the development of technology and the economy came commensurate changes in desires. Society needed no longer, it seemed, to be defined by scarcity. There was a major release in the way people expressed themselves and a widening of boundaries beyond former relatively narrow confines. So futurism, cubism, socialism and jazz accompanied the rise of the car and the aeroplane. These were 'Modern Times', as the Charlie Chaplin movie had it. By the time of the Great Depression which aborted many cultural experimentations, Zaretsky claims that culture 'in the modern sense of the word had been born'. He relates this to the views of the New York literary critic who was suffused with psychoanalysis, Lionel Trilling, who held that there were now new ways of 'conceiving the self, even extending to 'the unconscious of society' (pp. 138–162).

Zaretsky claims that psychoanalysis had a 'core theory' until the end of the 1960s, the analysis of the resistance. Freud had changed from analysis of the unconscious to analysis of the negative transference (pp. 169–170). In fact he claims that 'the focus on resistance was at the heart of the analytic contribution to modernity'. Zaretsky links analysts' 'know-it-all' attitudes with this theory (pp. 171–173).

The evolution from the original all male comrades-in-arms, including the dissolution of the Committee in 1926, to the profession is important. There was a move from an informal small group of people to more formal, less intimate groups. It is interesting to see how many analysts participated in the 1920 International Psychoanalytic Congress—112, half of them from Austria and Hungary (the old Austro-Hungarian empire). As Zaretsky observes, it was important to 'routinise' Freud's charisma toward an independent, less personal form of authority and governance. The Berlin, London and Vienna institutes became much larger and instituted training programs (pp. 174–180).

Zaretsky notes three sources of resistance to psychoanalysis: the Catholic Church, organised Marxism and organised medicine. It is understandable why the Church would oppose psychoanalysis—Freud's ideas about sexuality to begin with were anathema. Also, Marxists opposed psychoanalysis as 'bourgeois individualism' that simply worked as band-aid for the evil capitalist system. Freud's claim for the scientific status of psychoanalysis rested on a positivist view of science which was in decline at the time. But that changed (pp. 183–188).

In western democratic countries there were changes in the family that Zaretsky claims came from societal changes in production and consumption. Women entered public life with the vote but also were at the centre of the family-based consumer economy, 'restructured sociologically and reconstructed at a psychological level'. Zaretsky connects women's struggle for equality in the public sphere while exploring gender differences in the family sphere. Ideas and how they are adopted do not develop in a vacuum.

Zaretsky highlights two changes: first, the view that mothering involved social as well as private responsibilities; second, that women became more publicly interested in sexual satisfaction, including homosexuality. Many more women became analysts and issues of sexual difference and 'female psychology' came to greater prominence with greater emphasis on individual autonomy and experience (pp. 193–195).

For Zaretsky Freud was unsuccessfully trying to understand female sexuality in part through his

theories of the phallic stage, the castration complex and the Oedipal crisis. He explains some other developments by colleagues on these matters that emphasised the importance of relationships with the mother. The consequence of such studies were a crucial move from emphasis on the father in the earlier days of psychoanalysis to focusing on the mother. The shift was precipitated, Zaretsky claims, by trying to understand women's desire for men (pp. 203–207).

The development of understanding of women's psychology proceeded in the 1920s and expanded to understanding intrapsychic reality itself as not asocial or apolitical. The Depression and the rise of Fascism, meant that many thought a social and political dimension should be added. Karen Horney adapted psychoanalysis to women's emancipation as Reich adapted it to antifascism. Horney went beyond the issues of sexuality to claim that hostility was not innate. Instincts were not intrinsically opposed to culture, as Freud argued, but the struggle was instead between cooperation and competition. The neo-Freudians denied the death instinct and viewed destructiveness as being created by human society. Many were leftists, even Utopians attracted by socialist and communist ideas. In the last phase of his life Freud intervened again in the debates about female sexuality where he laid emphasis on the child's relationship with the mother. Freud emphasised activity over passivity and the different paths boys and girls took at the Oedipal juncture. It was a 'crucial moment' in the development of psychoanalysis when such issues were brought into relation to sexual difference (pp. 207–213)

Zaretsky emphasises the psychological distinction between public and private domains set by the second industrial revolution. 'Mass society' versus the 'individual' became an issue, especially the far left and the far right. Mass production increased markedly along with state intervention in the economy, society and welfare. With the rise of sexualised mass culture came greater influence of psychoanalytic ideas on discussions about the private and public, about identity and the changing nature of personal and family life. Fascism focused on communal symbols and penetrating the soul (pp. 217–219).

Zaretsky remarks upon a 'dread of politics that went far beyond caution', especially in relation to Nazism and psychoanalysis. The story of migration of analysts in flight from Hitler is not reassuring. There was some welcome but it must be recalled that this was the era of the Great Depression. There was concern among analysts in a number of countries about allowing European analysts in. US analysts feared that they would be taken over by the Europeans (they were right) and tightened the rules considerably about becoming members in the US by requiring medical qualifications. With Hitler, the epicentre of psychoanalysis changed from Berlin and Vienna to New York and London. Zaretsky describes Freud's stance through all this as 'opportunistic'. Freud had such faith in psychoanalysis that he thought it would survive in some form through Nazism, and that would be a good outcome ('saving' psychoanalysis). 'Opportunistic' is a nice word for denial, turning a blind eye to what was going on. Freud himself, despite many entreaties, only left Vienna at the last moment around the *Anschluss*.

Zaretsky discusses the Institute for Social Research (known as the 'Frankfurt School') which took Marxism (what they called 'critical social theory') and psychoanalysis very seriously. Founded in Frankfurt in 1923 with Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno as early associates, it later moved to Columbia University in New York. The Frankfurt school, particularly the work of Herbert Marcuse, was important in the recrudescence of humanist Marxism and the new left in the 1960s.

Freud's writings during the 1930s reflected the political and cultural situation. Freud thought individual psychology was social psychology—it was not that Freud thought individually and Reich et al thought socially. The point was that Freud and the Marxists had different social theories. The Marxists believed that society created the individual essence. For them, a different society under a different mode of production (and thus social structure) would imply quite different psychosocial realities. People would not be wantonly aggressive and states would get on with one another. Yet Freud adopted a Hobbesian view of culture, much more in line with the way the world had behaved during the first part of the century, and much more in line with the then unthinkable atrocities of the Holocaust.

Zaretsky observes that both world wars made for rethinking modern subjectivity. The 1930s, as the prelude, were replete with concerns as well as turning a blind eye to what was going on, but the true unspeakable horror of Nazism only emerged with the Holocaust. Nazism, as we have seen, had a momentous impact on the psychoanalytic movement (pp. 238–245).

Zaretsky sees psychoanalysis as changed, and that in particular the pre-oedipal focus was a major change with the emphasis on the centrality of the mother. These developments went in tandem with the changes in social systems where many of the proposals of the socially oriented analysts came to pass in Roosevelt's New Deal as well as the later postwar welfare states. It should be observed that the Great Depression was a great marker for the 30s. Before then there was burgeoning prosperity in the US before the 1929 stock market crash, but at the same time Europe was recovering from the major effects of World War I. The Great Depression stymied this recovery and misery revisited Europe and the wider world. The Great Depression disappeared into World War II which jump-started and mobilised the US economy in particular, but the depression and war were still fresh in people's minds. Postwar reconstruction was a high priority. Technology had advanced greatly over the war period as had, given the exigencies of the war, large scale planning (pp. 249–251).

The Kleinian development had major political consequences in the British Society and the struggles between Klein and Anna Freud became significant as did those between London and Vienna. Freud's arrival in London had an effect there but his death also precipitated conflict between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein still further. There was a long period of mourning (maybe it's not over yet). The place of Freud in psychoanalysis is central—just think that from Breuer and Freud's *Studies on Hysteria* until his death was over 40 years. Since his death in 1939 it's only another 65 years. Freud's contributions were mammoth over his life and everybody else lived in the giant's shadow. The psychoanalytic movement was founded on an important element of identification and the Oedipal guilt about killing or rebelling against the father was often not resolved. How often are issues 'resolved' by saying 'Freud said ...'? (pp. 259–263).

A predominantly female psychoanalysis gathered around Klein who became increasingly a mother figure for many. This was, Zaretsky argues, in line with the way that in England the relationship with the mother was central while marriage was emotionally less so. Citing a Riviere and Klein exchange, Zaretsky shows that they were not so much focused on negativity about homosexuality, but aimed 'to redefine manliness as the son's ability to protect the mother-child relationship'. Not only had the role of the mother been underrated but its systematic consequences needed to be explicated. It was vital to recognise vulnerability and dependence in both sexes, including the implications for ethical responsibilities and child rearing. This proved of special importance during the war years. Zaretsky observes that the mother image was at the centre of the welfare state. Interestingly, in 1943, Churchill, a conservative, called for a compulsory health insurance scheme that became the National Health Service under Labour five

years later (pp. 263–265).

Zaretsky turns to the conditions or context for the development and reception of Kleinianism. Despite the large number of British wounded, dead and traumatised as a result of the War, there were what Zaretsky rightly depicts as ‘enormous integrative energies’. It is well known for example that the incidence of neurosis during the war declined. Solidarity and identity, working together for a just cause, is good for mental health. Sociologically, it liberated youth (many of whom were in the armed forces), women (with new responsibilities) and class barriers became less marked as people worked together against an evil enemy. As Zaretsky remarks, there was ‘an almost mythic sense of identification with core Western values’. The German Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony provided ‘V’ for victory. There was, at the time, a unitary reach beyond left and right in a common struggle. This provided a common view of the need for a welfare state (pp. 265–271). During the War, the psychiatric emphasis, given the resilience of the people, was not on shell shock but on the sequelae for many children who were orphaned or evacuated to the countryside. Thus there was more of an emphasis on the infant in psychoanalysis.

Another movement that involved group psychology was developed by analysts influenced by Klein but who did not agree with her sequestration of personal from institutional life. Although Klein was somewhat sceptical and pursued her own focus on the personal, it certainly did not prevent her analysands and supervisees developing their own theories beyond the couch stressing some of her important themes during times of great social cataclysm. The work of Bion and his co-workers responded to the social necessities of the war effort and its aftermath. The Tavistock Institute of Human Relations was formed in 1946.

The sea change of the war and its aftermath meant a new development of interest in mothering and the child. That sea change brought major social innovations as well as a change in the analytic culture as a whole which came to be represented by quite different spokespeople like Winnicott and Spock. In Britain, there was a ‘remasculinisation’ of British analysis and the war ‘refamilialised’ psychoanalysis. The place of motherhood changed, people were educated far more across classes about the ‘good enough’ mother. Also, Zaretsky observes, there was an entrenchment of the ideal of full time mothering in the coming welfare state. Zaretsky describes the psychoanalytic program that dovetailed with the welfare state as economically progressive while socially conservative (pp. 271–273).

The 200 analysts who emigrated to the US had a marked impact on psychoanalysis in the US and upon the US itself during the 1950s where psychoanalysis came to seem an inherent part of the culture. Two paths, Zaretsky asserts, became important: the ‘conservative’ that bolstered core beliefs in the cause of normalisation (such as homophobia and misogyny) and the radical critique of culture itself that became more prominent in the next decade of the sixties (pp. 276–277). It is easy to find in Freud and his followers mixed messages about homosexuality and negativity towards women. Adaptation to reality rather than challenging it can be seen as normalising, but it could also be seen as an important part of the way we humans survive as a species! It is one thing to ‘adapt’ in a Nazi or Fascist state such as in the 1930s and quite another to ‘adapt’ in a democracy such as the US, even with its flaws. What is needed is to both adapt and to challenge.

There is a romantic view of psychoanalysis that ‘it’ challenges evil realities (which it certainly didn’t under Hitler as we have seen). Yet what was the Cold War? Which side was right? The romance between psychoanalysis and the left has romanticised the left and demonised capitalism. To normalise under capitalism is not seen as remotely good. It is viewed as making a Faustian bargain by giving in to the demands of the Moloch for the sake of comfort and advancement, it’s

selling one's soul for an easy and rich middle class life.

There was critique of social control and conformity by a number of prominent thinkers such as Herbert Marcuse, Norman O. Brown, Philip Rieff and Lionel Trilling. This is an important corrective to complacency. The booming economy and standard of living of the fifties stood in stark contrast to the preceding very traumatic decades of the Great Depression, the War and Holocaust. Such traumas were within recent memory.

Zaretsky suggests that there are twin movements within psychoanalysis in the US, one promoting domesticity, adaptation and routinisation and the other focusing on the fundamental subversive critique of psychoanalysis. 'Social control' is the term that in the end is used to include Foucault's view that 'power' shifted from repressive to productive forms. This is the idea of the underlying population that is manipulated and has no power, except for a few brave idealistic warriors (normally intellectuals) who have seen through the ideological smokescreens that the 'establishment' has created (pp. 277–282).

We thus get to a critique of Hartmann and ego psychology which allegedly ignores in the US the radical edge of Freudian doctrine. Hartmann downplayed the drives and emphasised the relation with society. This, Zaretsky alleges, meant dovetailing with the social conformity project of contemporary society. Zaretsky argues that as psychoanalysis was at the centre of postwar social organisation a new form of social control and regulation came through subjective internal regulation via the ego. So Zaretsky quotes Foucault as arguing that social power was transformed from external constraint to internal production.

I am sceptical about this approach. Generalisations can be interesting and valuable, but to be valid they must be based on evidence. Foucault makes vast assertions that are worth considering but there are alternative explanations. The assertion is that we have been liberated from constraints only to have them replaced by even deeper invisible ones (except to the cognoscenti, i.e., those readers lucky enough to be let into the secret by Foucault and others). We are involved in some kind of capitalist conspiracy without knowing it, which is worse than before when at least we knew the enemy!

According to Zaretsky, US analysts were agents of rationalisation while being simultaneously transformed by it. This seemed to be via medicalisation but Zaretsky believes its causes lay deeper in the resonance between psychoanalysis and American mind culture as a form of social control.

The younger group of analysts who took over from the Eastern Europeans in the US professionalised the institutes, making a psychiatric residency a precondition for training. European immigrants spread across the US because the New York analysts did not want to have that much competition in New York when they arrived, and moved the immigrants out as quickly as possible (pp. 287–293).

I believe that the extent of medicalisation of US analysis took place in response to the immigration. Most of the Europeans were not medically trained so they had to get that training or be under the aegis of the US analysts. The American Psychoanalytic tightened its rules about the necessity for a medical degree in 1938, just when many Europeans were arriving. This was during the Depression and life was not easy for anybody at the time.

The relationship between psychiatry and analysis increased. During the 1950s more than half the chairs of psychiatry in the US were held by analysts. There was a boom economy and it is small wonder that people who had been deprived over the thirties and forties with the Depression and the War would be attracted to making some money and living comfortably.

Zaretsky suggests that at times analytic claims to be 'above politics' turned pernicious, as when Ernest Jones sent out two analysts to Rio de Janeiro, one a British anti-Nazi who founded one institute and former Nazi Goring Institute analyst Werner Kemper, who founded another of the IPA institutes in Rio de Janeiro after the war, and the sequelae to this.

The relation to McCarthy was something else. Most analysts were and are political liberals and McCarthyism did not sit comfortably with them. Whatever the pros and cons of the boundaries of civil liberties at the time, there can be no doubt today that the USSR infiltrated deep inside the US government and posed real threats to US security. In 1948 there was reason for the US to adopt a 'missionary stance'—it was just three years after the defeat of Nazism and the Marshall Plan was transforming Europe. The USSR had taken over many countries in Eastern and Central Europe with the Yalta Agreement, and had millions of troops at the ready.

Zaretsky claims that a particular 'sanitised' form of analysis was exported by the US to promote its own way of life, but I did not see any real evidence as to how this happened. We have an abstract collective noun as a proactive subject—by quirk of grammar, it *does* things! Putting together the developments in ego psychology as 'sanitising' psychoanalysis at the same time as assuming the worst about US intentions amounts to 'proving' that the US was successfully manipulating populations in terms of what the author sees to be a nefarious 'cold war' ideology.

Zaretsky ascribes to psychoanalysis a role as a vehicle for the transformation of subjectivity in an 'automated, mass-consumption society'. He suggests that a particular form of subjectivity was required and found. Ego psychology is seen to represent the answer to what would fit the bill for the ideology of subjectivity in the era of global late capitalism. Interesting as this is, this depends on the validity of the author's neo-Marxist conceptual framework (pp. 300–306).

The context of the 1960s was a boom period where Utopian points of view seemed appropriate. The sky wasn't the limit—we could even fly to the moon! The world seemed the sixties generation baby boomers' oyster. Scarcity seemed eliminable, Lyndon Johnson's 'great society' quite achievable. Segregation was being broken, the 'pill' made sexual promiscuity more acceptable, employment in jobs of our choosing and the 'good life' taken for granted. Sex, drugs and rock 'n' roll seemed ubiquitous, and it became common to joke that anybody who claimed to remember the sixties couldn't have really been there (pp. 307–310). However, insofar as psychoanalysts behaved like the charismatic cults Zaretsky suggests they were, they were not susceptible to society's influences that much. That is partly why they declined so much, they took so little note of the outside world.

The socioeconomic developments Zaretsky cites are important ones, but we need to be careful as to the conclusions that can be validly reached. The unseen hand of History seems at work manipulating mere humans. But ideas can have their own momentum and develop in their own way for a multiplicity of reasons, scientific, personal, technological, political or economic and weighing their specific influence is what counts. The broad sweep of the analogies in the development of psychoanalytic ideas over the period in tandem with social changes are interesting but the associations are not necessarily cause and effect.

Zaretsky notes the beginnings of the decline of psychoanalysis in the US around 1960. The mood of analysts was becoming more pessimistic. Of course, this needs to be put in perspective, as I am sure Zaretsky would agree. If one thinks of the history of the reception of psychoanalysis over the past century, the vast majority of that time is negative mode. The exception really was the fifties in the US. So the zenith then was unusual, not the norm. The normal state of psychoanalysis has been historically not to have been accepted (pp. 310–316).

As Zaretsky correctly points out, there was a correlative marked change in the image of the analyst in film from the forties and fifties to the sixties. In fact, as I have argued recently ('Psychoanalysis and its Discontents', *Psychoanalytic Psychology*, 21, pp. 339–352, 2004), the story of the missed opportunities around John Huston's 1962 film, *Freud: the Secret Passion*, was very significant. *Hollywood on the Couch* reveals many of the strange relations between analysts and the movies. I have noted the related but ignored effect of the suicide of Marilyn Monroe on the psychoanalytic movement. The contribution—or lack thereof—of psychoanalysts to cultural change is an important factor in itself. Zaretsky cites various psychoanalysts in favour of the Vietnam War, thus spelling the end of ego psychology. This is quite a generalisation. Many analysts were and are political liberals, not conservatives. Other factors were far more important in the decline of psychoanalysis in the US.

The emergence of Heinz Kohut and self psychology was a central development in US psychoanalysis. Zaretsky adopts a stereotyped approach to Otto Kernberg and basically dismisses his contributions as 'rearguard' actions. Of course, those that seem from Zaretsky's viewpoint to exhibit the future were new leftists and feminists from outside the cathedral. The 'explosion' of recognition was heralded in this for Zaretsky. While there were developments which needed to be noted in these areas, Zaretsky demonstrates his neo-Marxist perspective in dismissing the mainstream while celebrating the 'radicals'.

The reaction of the 'new left' to psychoanalysis was important. The new left during the sixties was mostly counter-cultural, taking the concept of Utopia seriously as a possibility that was being prevented by a society ruled by false consciousness, mainly late capitalism with advanced technology and communication. The importance of culture rather than economics was underscored. Here was a significant move to understanding the individual, albeit in social context.

As Zaretsky points out, the new left rejected repression and sublimation in favour of authenticity and individual expression. There was a rejection of Freud as part of the problem rather than part of the solution and the image of human beings as they could be was a romantic one, following Rousseau rather than Hobbes or Freud (pp. 316–320).

The philosophy of Marcuse and others of the 'Frankfurt School for Social Research', came to look very dated over the seventies and was dead by the 1980s. This was not the

case intellectually for psychoanalysis. In particular, it was certainly not true for the radical French analyst Lacan, whose major influence developed over the second half of last century around the world (pp. 320–325).

Around the period of the 1968 'French revolution', anti-psychiatry developed. This was mainly characterised by R.D. Laing, but involved other important theorists such as Michel Foucault who understood madness in social context. The redefinition of madness (rather than its being taken

for granted) meant a different approach towards social identity was developing. Feminism developed, often not using intrapsychic concepts but external ones, and psychoanalysis came to be seen by feminists (such as Millet and Firestone) as an enemy. On the other hand, Juliet Mitchell's *Psychoanalysis and Feminism*, was a landmark work on the relationships between psychoanalysis and feminism that emphasised how both domains could help each other (pp. 325–331).

In his epilogue (pp. 332–344), Zaretsky points to two strains in psychoanalysis, scientific and humanistic. Zaretsky raises the issue of the fate of the subject over decades, especially the decline of the psychoanalytic subject in the sixties. The psychoanalytic subject had, Zaretsky says, drawn its strength from the integration of a scientific and humanistic approach, which he asserts parted ways in the 1970s. The medical-scientific approach moved in the direction of pharmacology and neuroscience and drugs were correctly seen as more cost effective than therapy. The eighties brought pluralism in psychoanalysis and a combination of drugs with psychodynamic therapy.

There was also the development of psychoanalysis as a cultural hermeneutic where Freud was seen as an artist rather than scientist. This resulted, Zaretsky asserts, in the absorption of psychoanalysis into 'the recognition and "other directed" paradigm that was *unpsychological* and *antipsychological*'. There were moves toward 'normalisation' (really professionalisation) world-wide. It is true that there have been journals established. He makes some cogent points about the traumas throughout psychoanalytic history. He notes how acceptance in the IPA was a 'place among the persecuted' prior to the sixties and then changed.

The author maintains that the psychoanalytic profession has survived both pharmacological and cultural assaults. Of course Zaretsky believes that the core of personal life is what keeps psychoanalysis going, and that therefore its survival into the 21st century is dependent on cultural and institutional change—something with which I heartily concur. Psychoanalysis cannot be seen as an optimal treatment per se but as a set of understandings of the personal life of individuals within a social and cultural as well as a biological context.

Zaretsky asserts that the charisma of psychoanalysis has been an idealisation which has served the function of protecting personal life. We seem to be more attuned to the mind but, Zaretsky fears, 'we' are 'most effectively manipulated into compliance and assent'. However, I don't see the evidence for this—and I sense major problems when the passive voice is used about what is being done to 'us' by 'them'. A neo-Marxist framework today needs argument and evidence, not just assertion.

Zaretsky deserves to be complimented for the way he raises many cultural issues even if one does not agree with some of his conclusions. He has done yeoman service in drawing so many strands together and putting many important questions on the table.